In information theory, mutual information characterizes the maximal gain in wealth growth rate due to knowledge of side information on a gambling result; the betting strategy that achieves this maximum is named the Kelly criterion. In physics, it was recently shown that mutual information characterizes the maximal amount of work that can be extracted from a single heat bath using measurement-based control protocols; extraction that is done using "information engines". However, to the best of our knowledge, no relation between gambling and information engines has been presented before. In this paper, we briefly review the two and then show an analogy between gambling, where bits are converted into wealth, and information engines, where bits representing measurements are converted into energy. From this analogy follows an extension of gambling to the continuous-valued case, which can be useful for investments in the stock market using options. Moreover, the analogy enables us to use well-known methods and results from one field to solve problems in the other. We present three such cases: maximum work extraction when the probability distributions governing the system and measurements are unknown, work extraction when some energy is lost in each cycle, e.g., due to friction, and an analysis of systems with memory. In all three cases, the analogy enables us to use known results in order to obtain new ones.
I. INTRODUCTION
While both work extraction from feedback controlled systems and information theoretic analysis of gambling are old concepts, to the best of our knowledge, the relation between them has not been highlighted before. This relation includes a straightforward mapping of concepts from one field to the other, e.g., measurements are analogous to side information and control protocols -to betting strategies. Fundamental formulas in either field apply to the other after simple replacement of variables according to the mapping found. This allows us to gain insights on one field from known results in the other.
The relationship between work extraction and information was first suggested by Maxwell [1] in a thought experiment consisting of an intelligent agent, later named Maxwell's demon; the agent measures the velocity of gas molecules in a box that is divided into two parts by a barrier. Although both parts have the same temperature to begin with, the molecules inside the box have different velocities. The demon opens
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The work of N. Merhav was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF), grant no. 412/12. a small hole in the barrier only when a faster-than-average molecule arrives from the left part of the box, allowing it to pass to the right part, and when a slower-than-average molecule arrive from the right part of the box, allowing it to pass to the left part. By doing this, the demon causes molecules of higher energy to concentrate in the right part of the box and those of lower energy -to concentrate in the left part. This causes the right part to heat up and the left part to cool down, thus enabling work extraction when the system returns to equilibrium, in apparent contradiction to the second law of thermodynamics. This experiment shows how information on the speed and location of individual molecules can be transformed into extracted energy, setting the basis for what is now known as "information engines".
Extensive research and debate has centered around Maxwell's demon since its inception, expanding the concept to more general cases of feedback control based on measurements, where work is extracted at the price of writing bits [2] - [6] . However, it was not until recently that Sagawa et al. reached an upper bound on the amount of extracted work [7] , [8] , owing to the development of fluctuation theorems. That bound was found to be closely related to Shannon's mutual information, hinting at a possible relation to information theory, a relation that was not yet explored in full.
Another field where bits of information were given concrete value is gambling, through the analysis of optimal gambling strategies using tools from information theory, an analysis that was first done by Kelly [9] . The setting consisted of consecutive bets on some random variable, where all the money won in the previous bet is invested in the current one. Kelly showed that maximizing over the expectation of the gambler's capital would lead to the loss of all capital with high probability after sufficiently many rounds. However, this problem is resolved when maximization is done over the expectation of the capital's logarithm. Moreover, the logarithm of the capital is additive in consecutive bets, which means that the law of large numbers applies. Under these assumptions, the optimal betting strategy is to place bets proportional to the probability of each result, a strategy referred to as the "Kelly criterion". Kelly also showed that given some side information on the event, the profit that can be made compared to the one with no side information, is given by Shannon's mutual information. This serves as another hint at a possible relation between information engines and gambling, as the amount of work that can be extracted using measurements, compared to that which can be extracted without measurements, is also given by mutual information.
In this paper, we present an analogy between the analysis of feedback controlled physical systems and the analysis of gambling in information theory. We show that finding the optimal control protocol in various systems is analogous to finding the optimal betting strategy using the Kelly criterion. Furthermore, the amount of work extracted after n cycles of an information engine is shown to be analogous to the capital gained after n rounds of gambling. The analogy is then shown on two models: the Szilard engine, where the particle's location is discrete, and a particle in some potential field, where the location can be continuous. The latter prompts us to consider an extension of gambling to continuous-valued random variables, which can be useful for investment in the stock market using binary options.
This analogy allows us to generalize the models presented here to more elaborate cases, such as gambling on continuousvalued random variables. Moreover, it enables us to develop a simple criterion to determine the best control protocol in cases where an optimal protocol is inapplicable, and an optimal protocol when the probabilities governing the system are not known. Finally, well known results for gambling with memory and causal knowledge of side information are transferred to the field of physical systems with memory, yielding the bounds on extracted work in such systems.
II. THE HORSE RACE GAMBLING
The problem of gambling, as presented in [9] and [10] , consists of n experiments whose results are denoted X n , e.g., the winning horse in n horse races. We are concerned with the case where the gambler has some side information, Y n , about the races. The following notation is used:
• P X -the probability vector of X, the winning horse. • P X,Y -the joint probability of X and Y . • P X|Y -the conditional probability of X given Y . • b X|Y -the betting strategy, i.e., the fraction of the gambler's capital invested in each horse, given Y . • o X -a vector describing the amount of money earned for each dollar invested in the winning horse, for each horse. • S n -the gambler's capital after n experiments. P X (x), P X,Y (x, y) and P X|Y (x|y) denote the probability mass function (PMF) of X, the joint PMF of X and Y , and the conditional PMF of X given Y , respectively. Similarly, b X|Y (x|y) and o X (x) denote the fraction of capital invested and odds, respectively, for X = x and Y = y. The probability vector of X given Y = y and the betting strategy vector given Y = y will be denoted as P X|y and b X|y , respectively. We assume that the experiments and side information are pairwise i.i.d, i.e., P X n ,Y n (x n , y n ) = n i=1 P X,Y (x i , y i ), and that each round, the gambler invests all of his capital.
Without loss of generality, we will set S 0 = 1, namely, the gambling starts with 1 dollar. S n is then given by:
and maximization will be done on log S n . We define the profit at round i as
Since the races are assumed i.i.d., the same betting strategy will be used in every round, i.e. b Xi|Yi = b X|Y ∀i. As shown in [10, Chapter 6] , the optimal betting strategy is given by:
Substituting b * X|Y into (1) the following maximum is derived:
As defined in [9] , the bet is "fair" if o X (x) = 1/P X (x). It can be seen from (4) that, without side information, no money can be earned in that case. For a fair bet, where side information is available, (4) can be written as
where I(X; Y ) is Shannon's mutual information. In this paper, we are mostly concerned with fair bets. Another point of interest is a constrained bet, which is a fair bet where for each y, b X|y is limited to some set B of possible vectors. For such a bet, the maximal gain is given by
where D(·||·) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence and for each y the optimal b * X|y ∈ B is the one that minimizes D(P X|y ||b X|y ).
III. THE SZILARD ENGINE
We now describe the Szilard engine [11] , which involves a single particle of an ideal gas enclosed in a box of volume V and attached to a heat bath of temperature T . The engine's cycle consists of the following stages (see Fig. 1 ):
1) The particle is moving freely in equilibrium with the heat bath. 2) A divider is inserted, dividing the box into two parts of volumes
The part of the box that contains the particle is denoted by X, with the alphabet X = {L, R}.
3) A noisy measurement of the particle's location is made;
the result is denoted Y with Y = {L, R}. 4) Given Y = y, the divider is moved quasi-statically 1 until the volumes of the parts are set to the prescribed volumes V L f (y) and V R f (y). 5) The divider is removed from the box. Denote the normalized initial volume as 
Since the particle starts each cycle in equilibrium with its environment, different cycles of the engine are independent of each other. Assuming v 0 (x) to be the same for each cycle, X n are i.i.d. with P X (x) = v 0 (x). Following the analysis in [12] , the work extracted for Y = y is given by
where k B is the Boltzmann constant. It was also shown in [12] that, for every
and the maximal amount of work extracted after n cycles is
Note that the initial location of the barrier v 0 (x) can also be optimized, leading to the following formula
An analogy with gambling arises from this analysis, as presented in Table I . The equations defining both problems, (2) and (7) , are the same when renaming b X|Y as v f and o X as 1/P X . The analogy also holds for the optimal strategy in both problems, presented in (3) and (8), and maximum gain, presented in (5) and (9), where log S n is renamed W n /k B T .
Specifically, the Szilard engine is analogous to a fair bet, since v 0 (x) = P X (x) and this is analogous to o X (x) = 1/P X (x). As stated previously, in a fair bet no money can be earned without side information. In an analogous manner, no work can be extracted from the Szilard engine without measurements, which conforms with the second law of thermodynamics. Moreover, the option to maximize over P X prompts us to consider an extension to horse race gambling, where the gambler can choose between several different races and thus maximize (5) over all distributions P X in some set of possible distributions.
IV. A PARTICLE IN AN EXTERNAL POTENTIAL AND
CONTINUOUS-VALUED GAMBLING We now consider a system of one particle that has the Hamiltonian (energy function): 
Gambling
Szilard's engine X i -result of horse race in round i.
X i -location of the particle in cycle i. Namely, left or right. Side information.
Measurements results, possibly with noise. Y i -some side information on round i. Y i -noisy measurement of the particle's location in cycle i. P X -probability vector of the result. P X -probability vector of the particle's location. P X|y -probability vector of the result given side information y. P X|y -probability vector of the particle's location given measurement y. o X (x) -amount of money earned for every dollar gambled.
1/v 0 (x) -the reciprocal of the initial volume of the box's parts. Placing bets on different horses.
Moving the dividers to their final positions. Choosing the optimal race to bet on.
Choosing the optimal initial location for the divider. Extracted work. log Sn -log of the acquired money after n rounds of gambling.
Wn/(k B T ) -total work extracted after n cycles of the engine. Transforming bits to wealth.
Transforming bits to energy. (2), (3), (5) -Profit in round i, optimal betting strategy and maximum profit. where p is the particle's momentum, M its mass, x its location, and E 0 (x) is the potential energy. Again, the particle is kept at constant temperature T . The probability distribution of X is then the Boltzmann distribution that arises from E 0 (x), denoted P X . For now, we will limit ourselves to cases where P X|y is a Boltzmann distribution for every y ∈ Y, a constraint that will be relaxed later on. The optimal control protocol for such a system was presented in [13] and [14] to be as follows:
• Based on the measurement y, the external potential is instantaneously modified by the controller to a different one. It then follows that the Boltzmann distribution of X changes from P X to Q X|y , which for every y is the probability distribution of X chosen by the controller. The optimal final distribution, denoted Q * X|y , was shown in [13] and [14] to be equal to the conditional distribution of X given y, i.e., Q * X|y = P X|y . • The potential is changed back to E 0 (x) quasi-statically.
Noting that v * f , as presented in (8), equals Q * X|y , one notices that both in this case and in the Szilard engine the optimal control protocol is defined by P X|Y . Furthermore, (7) is also valid for this case, with v f replaced by Q X|y . If X is a continuous random variable, P X (x), P X|Y (x|y) and Q X|y (x) will be the particle's probability density function (PDF), conditional PDF and the PDF chosen by the controller, respectively.
The protocol presented above is optimal in the sense that it attains the upper bound on extracted work, i.e., (9) holds. If the controller controls E 0 (x) as well, the expression in (9) can be maximized over all the distributions P X . However, it is important to note that there will always be some constraint over P X , due to the finite volume of the system or due to the method of creating the external potential, or both. Thus, denoting by P the set of allowed initial distributions P X , the maximal amount of extracted work is given by
Another point of interest is that, while setting Q * X|y = P X|y may be possible in some systems, e.g. [15] , it is not necessarily possible, e.g., if for some values of y, P X|y is not a Boltzmann distribution. This gives rise to the following, more general, formula (13) where P B is the set of all possible distributions P X , which stems from the set of all possible potentials. Thus, for every y, the optimal Q X|y ∈ P B is the one that minimizes D(P X|y ||Q X|y ). Notice that this analysis holds for both continuous and discrete random variables X, Y .
It follows that the analogy presented in Table I can be extended to work extraction from a particle in an external potential. Again, this system is analogous to a fair bet, in conformance with the second law of thermodynamics. This system is also analogous to a constrained bet, as can be seen from (13) and its analogy with (6) . If X is continuous, an interesting extension to the gambling problem arises where the bet is on continuous random variables. We will now present this extension in detail.
A. Continuous-Valued Gambling
We consider a bet on some continuous-valued random variable, where the gambler has knowledge of side information. The gambler's wealth is still given by (1), but the betting strategy, b X|y (x), and the odds, o X (x), are functions of the continuous variable x instead of vectors. In the case of stocks or currency exchange rates, for instance, such betting strategy and odds can be implemented using options. The constraint that the gambler invests all his capital on each round is translated in this case to the constraint X b X|y (x)dx = 1 for every y. The optimal betting strategy is then given by b * X|Y (x|y) = f X|Y (x|y), where f X|Y (x|y) is the conditional PDF of X given Y , and the bet is said to be fair if o X (x) = 1/f X (x), where f X (x) is the PDF of X. For a fair bet, (5) holds and (6) holds with the sum replaced by an integral and each probability mass function replaced by the appropriate PDF.
We conclude that two often discussed schemes of work extraction are analogous to the well-known problem of horse race gambling or to the extension of that problem to the continuous-valued case, an extension that actually arose from the analogy. We will now discuss some of the possible benefits from this analogy.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANALOGY
The analogy that was shown in this paper enables us to use well-known methods and results from horse race gambling to solve problems regarding measurement-based work extraction, and vice versa. We present three such cases: maximum work extraction when the joint distribution of X and Y is unknown, work extraction when some energy is lost in each cycle, e.g., due to friction, and an analysis of systems with memory. In all three cases the analogy enables us to use known results to gain new insight.
A. Universal Work Extraction
In both control protocols presented so far, in order to achieve the upper bound of E[W ] = k B T I(X; Y ), it was necessary to know the conditional distribution P X|Y in advance. The question then arises whether this bound could also be achieved when the conditional probability is not known, e.g., a system with an unknown measurement error. For portfolio management, which is a generalization of horse race gambling, the problem of investment with unknown probability distributions was solved by Cover and Ordentlich [16] . They devised the µ-weighted universal portfolio with side information, which was shown to asymptotically achieve the same wealth as the best constant betting strategy for any pair of sequences x n , y n . Namely, lim n→∞ max x n ,y n 1 n log S * n (x n |y n ) S n (x n |y n ) = 0,
whereŜ n is the wealth achieved by the universal portfolio and S * n is the maximal wealth that can be achieved by a constant portfolio, i.e., where b Xi|yi = b * X|yi for all i. Following the notation in [16] ,b i (y i , x i−1 ) will denote the portfolio (vector of investments) at time i, given the causal knowledge.
Furthermore, choosing µ to be the uniform (Dirichlet(1, . . . , 1)) distribution, it was shown that the wealth achieved by the portfolio can be bounded by log S * n (x n |y n ) − logŜ n (x n |y n ) ≤ k(m − 1) log(n + 1), (15) where m is the cardinality of X and k is the cardinality of Y. For this µ, the universal portfolio can be reduced to the following betting strategy for the horse race gamble:
where n i (j, y i ) is the number of times X was observed to be j and Y was observed to be y i before the ith cycle, i.e., n i (j, y) = |{l : x l = j, y l = y, l < i}|, and similarly n i (y) = |{l : y l = y, l < i}|.
Using the analogy presented above, this universal portfolio can be adapted straightforwardly into a universal control protocol in cases where X has a finite alphabet. In this control protocol, Q Xi|y i ,x i−1 is given by the right-hand-side (RHS) of (16) and W * n −Ŵ n is bounded by the RHS of (15). Namely, the work extracted by this universal control protocol is asymptotically equal to the work extracted by the best constant control protocol, i.e., the control protocol in which Q Xi|yi = Q * X|yi for all i. However, this derivation is applicable only for finite alphabets.
B. Imperfect Work Extraction
Another result that arises from the analogy shown above is the analysis of an imperfect system of work extraction. Consider a system where some amount of energy f (x) is lost in each cycle, e.g., due to friction. The work extracted in each cycle is then given by
This is analogous to an unfair bet with the odds
where f T (x) = f (x)/k B T and T is an "unfairness" parameter. As shown in [10, Chapter 6] , if the gambler has to invest all the capital in each round, the optimal betting strategy is independent of o X (x), i.e., for the odds given in (18) the optimal betting strategy is still given by (3) . However, it may be the case that for some values of y the gambler should not gamble at all. In the same manner, the optimal control protocol for imperfect systems of work extraction is still given by Q * X|y = P X|y , but for some measurement results it may be preferable not to perform the cycle at all. Substituting Q * X|y into (17) and taking the average w.r.t. P X|y yields
Thus, the engine's cycle should be performed only if
C. Systems With Memory
Finally, we would like to analyze cases where the different cycles of the engine, or different measurements, are not independent. Again, we use known results from the analysis of gambling on dependent horse races. The gain in wealth due to casual knowledge of side information, as shown in [17] , is E[log S n (X n ||Y n )]− E[log S n (X n )] = I(Y n → X n ). (20)
The term I(Y n → X n ) n i=1 I(X i ; Y i |X i−1 ) is the directed information from Y n to X n , as defined by Massey [18] , and S n (X n ||Y n ) indicates the betting strategy at round i depends causally on previous results X i−1 and sideinformation Y i . The optimal betting strategy in this case is given by b * X n ||Y n (x n ||y n ) = P X n ||Y n (x n ||y n ), where P X n ||Y n (x n ||y n ) = n i=1 P Xi|Y i ,X i−1 (x i |y i , x i−1 ) is the causal conditioning of X n by Y n as defined by Kramer [19] .
Analogously, in a physical system of work extraction where different cycles are dependent, e.g., when the system does not reach equilibrium between cycles, the formulas presented so far are no longer valid. Instead, the controller's causal knowledge of previous states and measurements can be used, meaning the optimal control protocol is given by arg max
where for each (y i , x i−1 ), Q Xi|y i ,x i−1 is some probability distribution of X chosen by the controller. It follows that maximal work extraction using causal knowledge of Y n is
H(X i |Y i , X i−1 ) − H(X i ) .
(22)
Without access to measurement results, which is equivalent to setting Y i = ∅ for all i, the maximal work extraction is
This means the gain in work extraction due to causal knowledge of measurement results is
analogously to the horse race gamble, where the gain in capital due to causal knowledge of side information is I(Y n → X n ).
